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Following periods wherẽ successive governments deemed it necessary for unions and employers to limit wage increases, or freeze wage negotiations, the union movement sought a "return to free · wage bargaining". Free wage bargaining meant that unions should be free to drive home wage settlements by striking either in breach of the law or in breach
•
Mediator, Dunedin of the spirit of the law upon which the compulsory arbitration system was ~ounded. There was no 11ecipn>eity for e· mployers · who remained yoked to the compulsory arbitration system, but in seeking freedom ~or the union movement to bargain without restriction, unions overlooked some of the logical accompaniments to free collective bargaining. If the union is free to bargain, so must the employer be free to bargain. If a union is free to strike over a collective agreement, it follows that the employer should also have unlimited freedom to bargain. The full range of freedoms include a freedom to refuse to go to arbitration, to refuse to · enter into collective bargaining, to refuse to accept the union as a legitimate bargaining agent, to refuse the application of an industry-based award to the employers particular ẽnterprise, and to refuse to bargain with or employ union labour.
Th· e dẽregulation or the labour market
In contrast to being part of a package to regulate industry, the Labour Relations Act is part of a package to deregulate New Zealand industry. A critical aspect of the Act is that compulsory arbitration is no longer provided for. The right to strike over new or renewed awards is enshrined in the new legislation. There is no longer direct legislative interv.ention into the bargaining arena. Unions are fr, ee to claim any quantum of wages, and any particular conditions of employment. But the unions · Can no longer compel the employers to go to arbitration. Settlements depend on bargaining power. Bargaining power in tum depends on the state of the economy, and at present the balance is against the union movement. Weaker unions may shortly experience the bitter taste of "free collective bargaining" and regret the passing of the compulsory arbitration system. However, , the Labour Relations Act only in part deregulates the labour market, and some conservative ideologues amongst employer . ranks are critical of the Act because it does not represent the full deregulation of the labour market. Compulsory unionism, union recognition and industry-wide bargaining :rights, which were all secured by the compulsory arbitration legislation. , remain less secure, , but nevertheless important features of the Labour Relations Act. However, deregulation, like free collective bargaining, is a te1u1 which is presently being used with a profound sense of confusion. It would be trite to recount the history of the monopoly and price-fixing on the pfoduct market, but it is necessary to remind free marketeers that monopoly is no less a goal of the players on the labour market. Governments intervene in labour markets because the natural object of the bargainers in the labour market is the same objective . as those on the product marketmarket dominance and monopoly. The his~ory of the laissez-faire approach to the labour market . reveals that the tactics of employers and unions alike can be not only unfair, but applied with such single-minded, self-interested ferocity that national interest is placed in jeopardy. The balance of bargaining power will not always remain in the employers' favour. , and an employer concern for regulating the labour market is likely to be reborn.
Freedom to strike and wage relativity
The central fiegulatory mechanism under the foaaner compulsory arbitration/union system was the prohibition of strikes and the requirement of , arbitration. Strikes wẽre illẽgal when a dispute of interest was being processed within the conciliation and arbitration procedures. Under lhe former Act disputes of right were to be determined by arbittation within disputes committees, and personal ,grievances against the employer (mainly unjustified dismissals) were settled within grievances committees. Strikes were also prohibited over issues which came within the jurisdiction of disputes and personal grievance procedures. The design of the compulsory arbitration system was based on the Labour mark, et nexibility 159 assumption that industrial dispu~es were best decided by reason of the court rather than the bargaining power of the parties.
Under the new Act, strikes over issues which fall within the jurisdiction of disputes committees and personal grievances remain illegal, but the Labour Relations Act incorporates the right to strike ovẽr interest disputes. There are no prohibitions related to striking while disputes remain in conciliation council. Arbitration is no longer compulsory. The parties to a dispute of interest must agree to arbitration. The fo1 tner responsibilities of the Arbitration Court have been divided between a new Labour Court and Arbitration Commission. The Arbitration Commission has the voluntary arbitration function in relation to disputes of interest While consultation with the Commission is required, there are no prohibitions against striking while these consultation procedures are carried out. ' The Labour Court retains the intelpfetation and enforcement functions.
A criticism of the former sys~em of compulsory arbitration is that awards were negotiared almost solely on the basis of intra-award felativities, and not on the basis of ' the industry's or company's capacity to pay. The te1n1 relativity has been used mainly to mean the historical relationship between kẽy award rates. Bargainers tended to trace the mathematical relationship ovẽr past settlements between a key rate in one award and the kẽy rate in a comparison award. The rates of registered electricians were related to indentured fitters, indentured fitters to indentured carpenters, indentured carpenters to labourers and clerical workers, labourers to drivers, and drivers to storepersons. The rationale of bargainers w, as either to pass on the going rate, or concentrate on a specific parity with a comparison award. In recent years the going rate has generally been the major feature with some attention being paid to macroeconomic argument during the initial pace setting award negotiations. But once pfecedence has been set, economic arguments have had little effect on the viability of outcomes in negotiations.
Compulsory arbitration was one aspect of the system which reinforced relativity. In contrast, the outcomes of collective bargaining within a deregulated industrial relations system are detenuined by bargaining pow, er. If the Distribution Workers Union has the power to bring comme11ce to a halt, then drivers can look forward to a more positive outcome than can the local body officers. Under the compulsory arbitration system the Local Body Officers Union had direct access to the Arbitration Co~ and either the , Court historically enforced the going settlement rate, or employers conceded what they knew the Court would enforce.
' The critical question raised by the Labour Relations Act is whether the bargainers will voluntarily continue to reflect in their settlements the overall sense that workers should be treated equally, at least in tettns of the minimum requirements of awards, or whether the economic fortunes of the individual worker shall be deteinained solely on the basis of bargaining power. Signals as to the futu~e behaviour of bargainers are mixed. In the last wage round, the first completed under the Act, two out of th£, ee settlements were reached between 7 and 8 percent. That statistic does not suggest that the Labour Relations Act has made any significant contribution to wage flexibility. The Metal Trades Award was initially settled at 7 percent, and Lhe vast majority of awards simply followed on without regard ~o variations in the individual industries' capacity to pay, or the individual bargaining strength of unions.
As always there are different views on whether 7 pe!icent was too little, or too much. One view was that 7 percent was too much.. The economy has suffered more than Lhe United States economy had suffered during the middle 1970s. C, ertainly, the recent announcement that unemployment has inclieased by 20 percent over the year ending March 1988 lends credence to this argument. Agreement between employers and unions exists that manufacturers are failing to compete on the domestic markets against the increasing cheap imports. The high dollar poses a barrier to exporters. These features were critical features of the u · nited States economy when in the late 70's and early 80's a large number of United States labour negotiations ended in nil wage increases, or "give backs" by unions. There are alternative arguments that 7 percent may not have been excessive. However, given the crippled state of various sectors of the economy, the unifonnity, if not magnitude, of settlements is astounding, particularly given the greater flexibility ẽither suffered or ẽnjoyed in markets other than the labour market. Against this, however, there were a small number of settlements which revealed a potential for greater wage · flexibility.
As a part of the ovẽrall Metal Trades settlement the parties agreed that there would be a restructuring of ' the engineering industry negotiations. The structure of the General Metal Trades Award was derived from the amalgamation of a number of separate industry awards in the 1970s. The Metal Trades Award will be split back into sector awards. The prospect has also been put forward that these sector awards may be negotiated on a composite basis with other unions in the sectors joining in negotiations for a composite sector award. The idea presumably is to negotiate awards which are sensitivẽ to the economic needs of individual industries. It should be pointed out howevẽr that this development is not because of the Labour Relations Act. Sector awards existed under the Industrial Relations Act prior to their amalgamation within the General Metal Trades Award. Provisions under composite negotiations also existed under that Act Hence, the : move has been at the initiative of the bargainers, not because of the requirements of the Act.
While there have been a limited number of composite agreements read under the old Act, the composite provisions did not succeed in encouraging widespread composite bargaining. It is also uncertain that other unions will takẽ up the engineers lead and join in composite bargaining, or agree to sectorise their own awards. In contrast, the Hotel and Hospital Workers Unions sought to negotiate a New Zealand Health Services Award which fequi.fed amalgamating three awards which applied in public hospitals, private hospitals, and rest homes. While the unions were not successful, significant improvements for rest home workers were gained, and the National Health Workers Award is likely to remain on the union's agenda during the next wage round. However, the objective will not be conceded easily by employers. Already private hospital employers have filed claims for a composite, private sector hospitals award citing both hospital workers and nurses. Evidently, e· mployers see a composite award providing some solution to demarcation problems between orderlies and nurses.
If these industry sector initiatives do succeed, there may well be greater wagẽ flexibility as the transport industry's settlement has revealed. The General Drivẽr's Award has in the past brought togẽther lh~ee major industry groups: general transport, contractors of heavy machinery in construction and ancillariẽs to employers of drivers in . manufacturing and other industries where transport is not the principle objective. ' The perceived capacities to pay off these three industries have not always . run in tandem, and award negotiations were then characterised by one or more sectors of employers refusing wage increases which the remainder found acceptable. Nevertheless, the wisdom until last year's negotiations was to keep the three sector award intact. This year negotiations broke down, and three individual sector awards were settled. The contractors settled frrst with an 8.6 percent increase plus a major adjustmẽnt to the industry allowance. The union insisted this represented approximately a 14 pefcent increase on average for drivers in the contracting industry. The transport award was then settled on the same basis. But negotiations ov, er the ancillary award floundered. After protracted negotiations, part of the industry settled on 8.6 percent for wages and 8.6 percent for the industry allowance. Rẽlativity was broken between the ancillaries and general transport and contracting ' With the exception of the Northern Industrial District The Northern Drivers Union has refused to accept the settlement, and are pursuing the issue on a job to job basis. Employers were willing to deal with the unions on an industry sector basis, and the industry sectors had clearly perceived differences in their capacity to pay or their ability to withstand industrial disruption . . Drivers ẽmployed in the manufacturing sector, arguably the weakest sector, received J.ess. In terms of industrial strength driv, ers are far weaker in the ancillary section. Small numbers of drivers are employed by a diversity of ancillary Labour market nexibility 161 employers. These drivers are more difficult to organise, particularly in the manufacturing sector, and their employers are suffering under tbe present ẽconomic policies. Nevertheless, many drivers employed by ancillaries drive the same trucks and carry out substantially the same duties as drivers employed by ttansporters. ' The settlement illustrates a clear shift from the basis of settling the award on the principle of equity, to the principle of industrial power. Importantly to the rest of the wage round, the 1.4 percent settlement was not accepted as a precedenl Under the compulsory arbittation system ' With the Court as a back up, experience was that the precedent would havẽ been followed throughout the remainder of the wage round. In fact the General Drivers Awanl was often placed early in the round because of the strategical advantages of the Drivers Union. The award was used as a pfecedent for the whole of the wage round. ' The drivers settlements may represent the first clear lesson about bargaining under the Labour Relations Act: unions with the power produce the results . .
The subject m,attẽr of collective bargaining ' The importance of union organisation and bargaining power is further rẽinforced by two alterations in the Act. Under the Industrial Relations Act the subject matter of bargaining was restticted by the definition of industrial matters. In conttast the Labour Relations Act does not define industrial matters. Similarly, the Industrial Relations Act restricted the objectivẽs of registered unions. , but under the Labour Relations Act no such restrictions exist. Unions with bargaining power will not only provide for better seu.lements over the traditional subjects of collective bargaining, but the range of subjects has ' been increased. That is particularly important as the welfare state continues to be dismantled. Clearly, superannuation is a critical .item for the future bargaining agenda. Major alterations to National Superannuation appear to be inevitable fegardless of which party is in power. While recẽnt removal of tax incentiv,es may initially discourage employer supported superannuation, the union movement will provide a fresh incentivẽ. No doubt national negotiations will feature not only the power of industrial punches, but important philosophic debate as to whose responsibility the supplementation of superannuation should be. Similarly, with moves towards a greater reliance on private health carẽ, employers will be asked to take responsibility f:or medical insurance. If North American patterns develop, then dental and legal insurance will also find ' their way to the bargaining agenda.
The irony of course is that the philosophers of the deregulated market, who have so strongly insisted ' that New Zealand society would improve if the individual took rẽsponsibility, arẽ going to be among those who are asked to pay, and their valid objections will be on fmancial, rather than philosophic grounds. The collective claims of the union movẽment are no less a result of individual initiative and co-operation than are the corporate demands of a collection of shafeholders organised into a limited liability company, . Strong unions will insist that the employers assume the responsibilities shed by the state, and the end result of the privatisation of New h.aland for many employers will mean greater, not lesser labour costs.
A second alternative is where the employer refuses to take over the former responsibilities of the State, but these responsibilities are assumed by a strong union. There is no longer within our labour legislation any prohibition against unions running their own superannuation, health, dental, and legal schemes, or for that matter operating their own businesses, or making substantial support provisions to assist individual workers' participation in industrial warfare. Where the union assumes these responsibilities, the . fesponsibilities will be funded from union dues. Under the Labour Relations Act there is no longer a limitation on what union dues may be required . . Union dues are paid through wages, and wages in turn paid by employers who negotiate with powerful unions. ' The additional increment to cover the necessary increase in union dues · will come out of the employers pocket. The unions' assumption of the former responsibilities of the State will cement the powerful loyalties of their membership. . But in the final analysis it is the employer who will pay the price both in terms of the wage bill, and in loss of the worker's loyalty.
Restructuring unions
The third alternative, and a real alternative in many industries, is that a particular union will not have the bargaining power to succeed against employers. In a system whose results are generated purely by bargaining powẽr, outcomes will become increasingly conspicuous. The union dues will be considered a worthy investment where the union delivers. Where the union fails in its delivery its membership will become increasingly frustrated, and in search of altemativẽs. One alternative is a competing and more powerful union. In practical terms the compulsory arbitration/unionism system granted in peq>etuity exclusive bargaining rights tor workers which fell within their jurisdiction as detennined by their rules rẽgistcred under the Act According to the free marketeers this has calcified a union structure which has been rendered by force of law incapable of changing with the times. This provided stability for the union's structure, and eliminated conflict in the work plaoe betwẽen competing unions, but did not allow unions to compete for one another's membership. Such competition is no longer prohibited.
Under the new legislation unions may compete for members, provided · they follow a set of procedures. These procedurẽs require that the union give notice to the Registtar of Industrial Unions, the central organisation of workers. , and any unions affected by a proposed change in coverage. The notic.e is to be to the ẽffect that within three · months a union intends to apply to the Registrar of Unions for approval to include a new category or categories of workers within their union membership. Extension of the coverage is subject to two ballots. Firstly, the union must conduct a ballot of its own membership to detennine if there is support to extend the coverage. If support is received. , then the Registrar is to conduct a ballot of workers to be covered by the extended coverage. If the members of the initiating union and the workers to be newly covered support the extension of coverage, in both ballots, then the Registrar of Unions amends the membership rule of the union to effect an extension of coverage.
While these changes al1ow for competition between unions~ the new Act does not provide for the ultimate competition between the union and employers. The new Act reenacts a system of compulsory unionism. This system allows the union to negotiate union preference provisions requiring all employees to join the union within 14 days of being requested to do so by the union. Failing agreement to a preference provision, the issue is to be dete1 nained by ballot carried out by the Registrar of Industrial Unions. The ballot is carried out over all ẽmployees in the industry. The history of tpis arrangement for preference provisions has been that industry-wide settlements have depended upon employers conceding the preference provision. , and employers have almost universally conceded. A variant of this arrangement was enacted under the previous government prior to their voluntary unionism enactment. This required balloting to deteunine union members' views as to whether the union should seek preference provisions. Universally, majorities of workers supported preference provisions.
Under the compulsory arbitration/unionism system union members of different unions received a remarkably unifonn reward for union membership. That may no longer be the case, and an increasing support for voluntary unionism amongst the membership of weaker unions is likely to result because these unions may be unable to deliver. Individual employers complain that the system does not allow them to compete for the hearts and minds of their own employees, and imposes a labour monopoly upon their industry. A sense of employee's genuine frustration with paying union dues to a union that cannot deliver may pro: mpt employer negotiators to oppose the incorporation of a Labour mar' ket nexibility 163 union membership requirement in the award. Voluntary unionism under the previous National Government was perceived by many employers as a brief but succẽssful experiment. An election of the present opposition party will mean a return to voluntary unionism, and there are those who predict voluntary unionism to be the outcome of the present split between the political and industrial arms of the labour party. Voluntary unionism will mean that weaker unions may wither in some industries. But under a system where unions may compete for membership, therẽ may be a genuine refo1naation of the union structure because workers will seek . membership within ẽffective unions. Workers will be attJacted to powerful unions which can deliver in a country where workers can no longer depend on the state for the basic protections, and where the law no longer limits the subject mauer of bargaining.
Bargaining units and ' labour mar· ket nex· ibility
The teun "industrial" union under the old Industrial Relations . Act was a misnomer. ' The Woollen Workers Union is not an industrial union but shares the wooDen industry with a number of occupationally based unions. The · C. Ierical Union was considered an industrial union, but in fact its membership is occupationally based and works in a wide range of industries from the automotive industry to the woollen industry. Similarly, the Building Trades Union is composed of various · tradesmen, and is a multi-occupationally based union. Its membership is engag. ed in a range of industries. For example, a carpenter may be employed in general construction, or in the maintenance of a . meat or wool processing plant. Therẽ is not a union for all workẽrs in a single plant A manufacturer may have 15 or 16 individual unions within his plant Nor are there industry unions in the sense of a single union for a particular industry, like for example a United Autoworkers Union. A number of ẽmployer organisations have argued that plant, or industry-wide unions are bargaining partners which would allow for greater flexibility betwẽen companies and industries in the sense of accommodating the economic circumstances of the individual company or industry. However, the Labour Relations Act does nothing to change the present structulie of the union movẽment from its occupational or multi-occupational basis, and in fact . may promote a further development of the union on a basis which embraces an even greater diversity of occupations.
Under the previous Act the objectives of a registered union were to protect and further the interests of workẽrs within a :ific industry or related industries. The Act restricted registration to a single "industry" (occupation) with limited exceptions where the Govemor-· General could dec' lare specific industries to be related to one another for the 11urposes of registration. ' There arẽ no such restrictions under the new legislation. St.fong unions · will not be company or industry based, but will add to their present multioccupational structure a diversity of occupations. Allowing competition between unions does not address the pfoblem of appropriate bargaining units. The reshaping of unions through competition, amalgamation, and federation or association, is likely to create unions who choose bargaining units no more susceptible to economic rationalisation than the bargaining units which are presently the subject of employer criticism.
In tet1ns of wage flexibility derived from plant bargaining, the provisions of the Act . actually provide a disincentive insofar as the union must be cautious in ẽndeavouring to negotiate agreements with individual employers separate from the award. Under the new Act the union must make up its · m. ind whether an industry-wide award shall have application to an ẽmployer. , or to directly bargain with the employer over the tenus and conditions to apply to the ẽmployers enterprise. Unlike the previous system where a contract of employment could be effected by both an award and a second-tier agreement pertaining to his individualẽmployer, the contract of ẽmployment can be affected by only one collective agreement An ẽmployer can be exempted from the award for the purpose of affecting an individual agreement in either of two ways. Firstly, the employer can be ••• cited out of the award at the commencement of award proceedings. The award is then settled separately, and the union negotiates directly with the employer. The union has the right to strike over the award, and if the employer is cited out, the union retains the right to strike over the individual agreement
The second way in which the union can negotiatẽ a separate agreement is to approach the employer during the duration of the agreement. If the employer is willing, an agreement can be achieved. However if the employer resists, the union cannot legally strike. By endeavouring to negotiate after the award is settled the union gives up its bargaining power. By citing out the employer before an award settlement, the union retains bargaining power, but takes a specific risk. The union becomes committed to a truly deregulated labour market. Once cited out, the employer can refuse to negotiate. If the union cannot force the employer's capitulation, then no collective agreement applies to the employees. Further, the union cannot regain coverage under the award unless agfeement is feached with the employer that his workers should be covered by the award. If no agreement applies, then the unqualified preference clause does not apply. Workers then have the full freedom to choose whether they wish to be or not to be a member of the union. The employer can ẽffectively refuse to recognise the union as a bargaining agent.
(The one ẽxception would be that the Labour Relations Act establishes the right of the union to represent its membership in personal grievances even if they are not covered by an awaro or collective agreement.)
The new legislation does provide for composite negotiations where several unions may negotiate with a single employer, or industry. The Act is designed to encourage this type of bargaining in that bargaining on a composite basis does not exclude the unions from award covẽrage if their negotiations fail. However, these provisions existed under the previous system, and fesulted only in a few composite agreements, notably in lhe motor assembly industry and on large, remote construction sites. If past history is an indication then nothing in the new legislation suggests a general move to composite bargaining within the individual work place, and there are disincentives for individual unions to negotiate with the individual employer.
The government has stated that its intentions , ar, e to strengthen the union movement so that it can survive what would be an ẽven : morẽ hostile environment if the present opposition were to become government. The ai· m is to create larger and more effective unions. Under the new legislation unions will require a mẽmbership of at least 1000 to retain registration under the Act. This aspect of the legislation in fact removes the possibility of plant unions with the vast majority of small Nẽw Zealand employers employing less than 1000 workers. Plant or industry-wide unions do not appear on the govẽmment's agenda. If the union movement responds to the potentials created by the Act, the national award system may in the future be held together by the bargaining power of a smaller number of morẽ powerful unions of a multi-occupational basis. But this change is likely to reinforce relativity rather than create greater wage flexibility. Õccupationally based awards saddle different industries with varying capacities to pay. Negotiations tẽnd to concentrate on comparisons of occupations because economic concerns differ significantly between industries, making the accommodation of any one industry difficult Uniformity during the 87/88 " 'age round?
' The compulsory arbitration system provided for the clear expression of what was once New Zealand ẽgalitarian philosophy by imposing a remarkable unifounity in wages and conditions within the national award syste: m. One would anticipate under free collective bargaining a grẽatẽr variation in settlements than under compulsory arbitration. The uniformity of the last wage round is difficult to explain. Perhaps this rẽlates to the cultural values of the bargainers, but the explanation is likely to be more concrete than the Labour market flexibility l65 flagging spirit of our national egal italian ism. A morẽ concrete ẽxplanation relatẽs to the occupational basis of the awards.. A labour relations manager for a large manufacturing plant may well act as a negotiator in several national award negotiations, and if not fot1nally nominated as a negotiator on the conciliation council, the labour relations managẽr will be an observer and participate in employer deliberations over other key negotiations.
His company will have a similar union rẽpresentation to other companies. Each manufacturer represented at the negotiations will have a number of national awards applying at their plant. National awards will be accommodated by at least three different arrangements. Firstly, some manufacturers will simply pay award rates. Secondly, some manufacturers will pay a set margin above award rntes. Thirdly, some manufacturers will pay new employees the award rate, but increase rates of pay after a period when the worker proves satisfactory. Most pay structures within the industry will key off the award movements, but will have additional increments which reflect the labour market conditions in the area.
While employers may des. i re the flexibility to make adjustments that reflect the different circumstances between companies. , the same flexibility for intra-company adjustmẽnts between different sets of workers is not as practical. Employees make clear and highly charged comparisons to other employees within their own company. Wage and salary systems endeavour to provide a rationale that employees view as fair. Job evaluation is generally weighted £or equity considerations, whereas market forces deteinaine rates on the basis of supply and demand, rather than skill, effort and responsibility. If a concession ensures the continuing viability of the company, workers might wẽar a 3 percent increase when a neighbouring company has granted 6. However, granting 6 percent to drivers and 3 percent to storepersons within the same company has serious implications for moral and in-plant industrial relations, and is likely to precipitate action by store workers to regain parity. U n: iformity in national award settle. ments is thereforẽ desirable from the in-plant wage and salary administration perspective. This is because the award settlements generally affect the base of the in-plant wage , and salary administration structure of the individual company.
Negotiators will strongly resist claims in the ancillary drivers award which exceed those granted to storepersons. õn the other hand employers n1ay grant an increase to clerical workers which ẽquates to the storeperson's increase., even when the clerical workers do not have sufficient bargaining powẽrs to gain the general incrẽase granted to storeworkers. The general emphasis in bargaining will not be towards variability, but to set a low and consistent general : movement applying to key awards within the individual enterprise, and ' Which affect the base of the in-plant or enterprise wage and salary structure. The simple reason ~or wage unifonn:ity in the last wagẽ round is that the employẽrs do not desire wage flexibility within the award structure, and the balance of bargaining power is at present tipped in the ẽmployers direction. The flexibility ' that some employers want is an inter-company flexibility, and the new system neither provides for company unions nor requires occupationally based unions to bargain on a company basis.
Future trends and wage flexibHity
If the deregulation of the labour felations system had been more complete, company or plant bargaining units could be arrived at because union recognition and the bargaining unit, itself, would be negotiable items. The bargaining power of the employer would be a detet. aninant in deciding whether his company would be party to a plant, as opposed to an industry-wide, union. However, the Labour Relations Act is not designed to promote plant or company bargaining. Conciliation remains compulsory with unions registered under the Act, and ' therefore union recognition is not an item for bargaining. The employer might persuade the union to cite the company out of the award, but the employer does not have the right to refuse to be party to the award. There~ore the etnployer must both recognise the union for the purposes of bargaining, and be party to an industry-wide bargaining unit. . According to a recent decision of the Labour Court, the employer does not have bargaining rights with respect to the type of bargaining unit even if his workers desire a separate agreement against the wishes of the union (Finnigan, D. in . Meat Workers Union v "'entec Corp Ltd.) . Nor can the workers break away from the union to form a plant union and thereby change the bargaining unit. Nor can the employees of a single employer decide they do not wish to be in the union. While union employ. ment preference may be rejected, the vote is taken on an industry-· wide basis, and not a company basis. The Act simply prohibits these types of adjustments. Unions have retained the power to cite all employers within an industry and to negotiate on an industry basis. These provisions of the Act encourage a continuation of occupationaHy based industry awards which give impetus to wage uni:fo1 anity.
While wage unifonnity has been the trend since the lifting of the wage freeze, there have been a few exceptions. In the Building Industry an industry allowance has been granted which represents an additional margin. The margin has been passed on to some awards which have application in the building industry, but the margin has not been reflected in other awards which hav, e had traditional relationships to the Building Trades Award, but which do not apply to the building industry. The Building Trades Labourers have picked up the industry alJowance, but the industry allowance has not followed on to the General Metal Trades Award where there has been a link between the carpenter and fitter. However, the allowance has been reflected in the H· eating and Ventilating Award to which the Engineers Union is a party. , and which applies to the building industry. Similarly, the allowance has been reflected in the Electrical Contractors Award, but not the Maintenance Electricians Award. Therefore, certain engineering and , electrical tradesmen employed in the Building Industry have received additional increments pertaining to the Building Industry, whereas maintenance electricians and ẽngineering tradesmen have not feceivcd the additional incre: ment. Maintenance tradesmen have been constrained to accept the general increase detennined by the ailing manufacturing sector.
Negotiating a series of awards applying to a single industry and not between industries might be a first step to composite bargaining which some employers view as a more positive commitment to wage flexibility. However, the extra movement in the multiple award arrangement has not been because the unions seek general wage mobility . . Unions will not wish to attach themselves to a composite agreement which lags behind or provides for downward movements in \vages and conditions.
Givẽn that the occupational structure of unions is not altered by the Act, given that unions detennine what bargaining units they enter into, and given that the economy is not buoyant, the short term prospects of a more highly flexible wage system are not encouraging. The pressure will continue Lo constrain initial settlements and to retain relativity by virtue of handing out the same percentage increase to each union without the power to effectively buck the system. The trade-off is likely to be the maintenance of the national award structure in exchange for modest increases in the overall structure. For the near future such a trade-off may well suit the economic plight of the country. In · the . medium teun the balance of bargaining power will inevitably shift. · workers wiU be attracted to strong unions which can deliver, and the structure of the union movem, ent wiH alter lhrough competition between unions. In the long tenn a corresponding shift wiH subsequently ẽvolve in the national award structure, but this change of award structure is unlikely to represent greater wage flexibility between companies. As long as occupationally based awards saddle employers and industries with varying economic fortunes, the collective bargaining systen1 will not account for the capacity of the individual employer or industry to pay.
